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Civil Court of the City of New York

11111111 II IIlllllllllllllllllll llll llll Ill
Index #: LT-051048-19/NY
Motion Seq#: 2

County of New York
Part Part F, Room: 830

Decision/Order
Windy Realty Associates, LLC
Petitioner(s)
-againstAdelina Duran Hiciano; "John" "Doe"; "Jane" "Doe"
Respondent(s)

Present: Frances A. Ortiz

Judge

Recitation, as required by CPLR 22 I 9(A), of the papers considered in the review of this Motion for:
Dismiss

PAPERS

NUMBERED

Notice of Motion and Affidavits Annexed
Order to Show Cause and Affidavits Annexed
Answering Affidavits
Replying Affidavits
Exhibits
Stipulations
Other _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

_ __:2_ _____

____ 3_ _ _ __

Upon the foregoing cited papers, the Decision/Order in th is Motion is as fol lows:

This is a holdover proceeding involving a rent stabilized apartment. The notice of
termination indicates that respondent, Adelina Duran Hiciano, ("Ms. Duran-Hiciano") violated
and continues to violate a substantial obligation of her tenancy. Specifically, the notice states
that Ms. Duran-Hiciano is in violation of paragraph 42 of her lease. The language of paragraph
42 is quoted in the notice. According to such paragraph,
. . .. Renter, their fami lies, guests, employees, or visitors shall not engage
in any conduct which makes the apartment or building less fit. ... Renter
shall not make or permit any disturbing noises .. .. Renter shall not play a
musical instrument or operate or allow to be operated audio or video
equipment so as to disturb or annoy any other occupant of the building.
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The notice alleges that Ms. Duran-Hiciano is allowing constant loud noises and music to
emanate from her apartment and that management has received numerous complaints for loud
music parties on 11 /25/18, 11/24/ 18, 10/28/18, 10/21/ 18, 8/17118, and 8/ 18/ 18.
Petitioner states that respondent was not provided with an opportunity to cure the default,
before the notice of tennination was served because such conduct is not curable pursuant to
paragraph 17 of the lease. According to paragraph 17, in the event that a renter does not comply
with any lease, creates a nuisance, engages i:n conduct detrimental to the safety of other renters,
then the owner may terminate the tenancy a1nd lease upon ten days written notice. The Notice of
Termination indicates that Ms. Duran-Hiciano's tenancy is terminated based on a violation of
substantial obligation of her tenancy in violation of her lease, that she is engaging in
objectionable conduct which interferes with the comforts or rights of other tenants in the
building. Lastly, the notice of termination indicates that it is being served pursuant to 9 NYCRR

§2524.3 (a).

THE MOTION ARGUMENTS AND OPPOSITION
Now, respondent moves for summary judgment arguing that petitioner failed to serve her
with a required Notice to Cure for breach of her rent stabilized lease. Specifically, respondent
contends that petitioner tenninated her tenancy pursuant to 9 NYCRR §2524.3 (a) which requires
that a landlord before commencing an eviction proceeding pursuant to that section must first
serve a Notice to Cure. According to 9 NYCRR §2524.3 (a),
Without the approval of the DHCR, an action or proceeding to recover
possession of any housing accommodation may only be commenced after
service ofthe notice rir~quired by section 2524.2 of this Part, upon one or
more of the following grounds, wherein wrongful acts of the tenant are
established as follows:
(a) The tenant is violating a substantial obligation of his or her tenancy
other than the obligation to surrender possession of such housing
accommodation, and has fai led to cure such violation after written notice
2

by the owner that the violations cease within 10 days; or the tenant has

willfully violated such an obligation inflicting serious and substanlial
injury upon the owner within the lhree-month period immediately prior to
the commencement ofthe proceeding. If the written notice by the owner
that the violations cease within 10 days is served by mail, then five
additional days, because of service by mail , shall be added, for a total of
15 days, before an action or proceeding to recover possession may be
commenced after service of the notice required by section 2524.2 of this
Part.
Respondent asserts that the only exception to the rule occurs when a landlord contends that the
tenant has willfully violated such an obligation inflicting serious and substantial injury upon the
landlord within the three-m onth period immediately prior to the commencement of the
proceeding. Respondent indicates that this exception is not applicable because nowhere in the
pleadings (notice of termination, petition or response to Bill of Particulars) does petitioner allege
that respondent inflicted "serious and substantial injury" upon the owner within the three month
period prior to the commencement of the proceeding.
Additionally, respondent argues that petitioner admits in the Notice of Termination that it
does not need to service a Notice to Cure because such conduct is not curable pursuant to
paragraph 17 of the lease. Ms. Duran-Hiciano in her affidavit in support of the motion indicates
that she never received a Notice to Cure nor any warning letters from her landlord about the loud
music parties. However, she indicates that she received a notice of termination which came as a
complete surprise to her. (Duran-Hiciano A.ff'd

~

9).

Further, respondent argues that petitioner's argument that it not need to service a Notice
to Cure pursuant to paragraph 17 of the lease is against public policy. She relies on statutory
authority and common law for this proposition. According to this 9 NYCRR § 2520.13,
An agreement by the tenant to waive the benefit of any provision of
the RSL or this Code is void; provided, however, that based upon a
negotiated settlement between the parties and with the approval of
the DHCR, or a court of competent jurisdiction, or where a tenant is
3

represented by counsel, a tenant may withdraw, with prejudice, any
complaint pending before the DHCR.
Respondent argues that an agreement that waives the benefit of a statutory protection is
unenforceable as a matter of public policy. Drucker v Mauro, 30 A.D.3d 37 (ls' Dep 't 2006),

appeal dismissed 7 NY 3d 844 (2006). Accordingly, respondent claims that paragraph 17 of her
lease is against public policy. As such, since the petitioner failed to serve a Notice to Cure nor
did it plead in the notice of termination that the respondent inflicted "serious and substantial
injury," the notice of termination is invalid and summary judgment should be granted in her
favor.

Petitioner in opposition argues that respondent' s motion for summary judgment should be
denied as respondent has failed to attach ne:cessary proof and that it was not required to provide
respondent with a notice to cure. First, peti.tioner contends that respondent did not state any
relevant facts to the motion. Petjtioner claims that its notice of termination fulfils the
requirements of 9 NYCRR §2524.3 because it clearly states "specific dates of Respondent's
continuous nuisance emanating from her apartment . ... " (Kahan Aff'rm

~18).

Second, petitioner

argues that no notice to cure was required because respondent inflicted serious and substantial
injury upon it. For instance, other tenants constantly complained about the noises from
respondent's apartment throughout the day and night, that three months prior to the
commencement of this holdover, respondent's behavior fai led to subside, and that there were
five more complaints made every month by neighboring tenants. Petitioner then stretches its
cause of action to characterize this behavior of inflicted serious and substantial injury as
"nuisance." As a result, petitioner then argues that nuisance behavior even if brought as a
substantial violation of the lease is incurabl1e.
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DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is appropriate where the movant establishes the claim by tender of
evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficiently to warrant the court as a matter of law to direct
judgment in its favor. Rodriguez v. Cityo/New York, 31NY3d312, 31 7 (2018); Friends of

Animals, Inc. vAssociated Fur Manufacturers, Inc., 46NY.2d1065 (1979). The failure to make
such a prima facie showing requires denial of the motion regardless of the sufficiency of the
opposing papers. Alvarez v Prospect Hospital, 68 N Y2d 320 (1986). "Once this showing has
been made, however, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment
to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of material
issues of fact which require a trial of the action." Alvarez v Prospect Hospital, 68 N Y.2d at 324.
In determining the motion, the Court must be mindful that summary judgment is a drastic
remedy and should not be granted when there is any doubt as to the existence of a triable issue.

Rotuba Extruders, Inc. v Ceppos, 46 N Y.2d 223, 231 (1978). The evidence must be considered
in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, Henderson v City ofNY, 178 A.D.2d

129, 130 (ls' Dept 1991), and the motion must be denied where conflicting inferences may be
drawn from the evidence. Nowacki v Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 242 A.D.2d 265, 266 (2 11d Dept

1997).

Here, respondent has demonstrated entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. The
salient and undisputed facts are that before the notice of termination was served, respondent was
not provided with an opportunity to cure the alleged default, and that this proceeding was
brought as a violation of substantial obligation of her tenancy and lease. (Duran-Hidano A.ff'd ~

9 & Exhibit A). It is also undisputed that 9 NYCRR §2524.3 (a) requires a landlord before
commencing an eviction proceeding for breach of a substantial obligation of a tenancy to first
5

serve a Notice to Cure. Alternatively, it is also undisputed that petitioner did not explicitly allege
in any of the pleadings (notice of termination, petition or response to Bill of Particulars) that
respondent inflicted "serious and substantial injury" upon it within the three month period prior
to the commencement of the proceeding. Therefore, any exception to serving a notice to cure is
inapplicable.

Petitioner cannot paint a predicate notice with several variables on the guise of finding
the conect theory. "A predicate notice cannot be based on 'catch all ' theories but must be
specific enough to apprise Respondents of the grounds upon which termination is based." 425
Third Ave. Realty Co. v. Greenfield, 13 Misc. 3d l 207(A) (NY Cty Civ. Ct. 2006). This is

exactly what petitioner attempted to do with this predicate notice and in the opposition papers.
At first, petitioner in the instant notice of termination claimed a violation of substantial
obligation of respondent' s tenancy and lease. Thereafter, in the opposition papers petitioner for
the first time claimed termination based on alternative theory of infliction of "serious and
substantial injury."

Lastly, petitioner in its opposition has failed to rebut respondent's claim that she was not
served with a Notice to Cure. Actually, petitioner admits in the Notice ofTennination that it
does not need to service a Notice to Cure because such conduct is not curable pursuant to
paragraph 17 of the lease. However, a lease provision like paragraph 17 of respondent's lease
that waives the benefit of a statutory protection is unenforceable as a matter of public policy.
(Drucker v Mauro, supra, ; 9 NYCRR § 2520. 13).

Accordingly, respondent's motion for summary judgment dismissing the proceeding is
granted for the reasons discussed above, and the proceeding is hereby dismissed.
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This is the decision and order of this court. Copies of this decision will be emailed and
mailed to the parties indicated below.

ORDERED: Respondent's motion for summary judgment is granted and the petition is
dismissed.

Date: April 8, 2020

Sperber Denenberg & Kahan, P.C.
Eric Kahan, Esq.
48 West 37th Street, 16111 floor
New York, NY 10018
(917) 35 1 - 1335
ekahan@sdkpc.com

Manhattan Legal Services
John Briggs, Esq.
5030 Broadway, Ste 664
New York, NY 10034
(646) 442 - 3 187
jbriggs@ lsnyc.org
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